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Article
Towards a New Jus Post Bellum: The
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
and the Improvement of Post-Conflict
Efforts and Accountability∗
Liliana Lyra Jubilut∗∗
The creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission and the United Nations Human Rights Council is
the main institutional outcome of the United Nations (UN)
reforms adopted upon the 60th anniversary of the organization.1
The need for the Peacebuilding Commission arose due to the
evolution in the UN’s post-conflict efforts since the Cold War.2
Examples of these efforts include the UN missions in Cambodia,
3
Angola, Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor, where the activities
4
ranged from monitoring elections to conducting the complete
5
administration of the territory.
∗
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to Prof. Simon Chesterman’s Selected
Problems in United Nations Law: State-building, governance and accountability
seminar at New York University School of Law (2006) and, in Portuguese, as a
chapter in my PhD thesis (2007) which was later published in Brazil (2010). The
author would like to thank Prof. Simon Chesterman, Ronli Sifris, Marjolein
DeBacker and Catherine Sweeter for their comments, assistance and suggestions.
∗∗
PhD and Master in International Law—Universidade de São Paulo; LL.M in
International Legal Studies—New York University School of Law; University
Professor (Faculdade de Direito do Sul de Minas- Brazil)
1. See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/L.1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/L.1, ¶¶ 97-105, 157-160 (Sept. 16, 2005) (describing the need for these
bodies, the institutional makeup, and their purpose).
2. See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED
NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 238 (2004).
3. Id. at 238-39.
4. See Id. at 66 (“The agreement required Indonesia to make arrangements,
with the assistance and participation of the UN Representative and his staff, to give
the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice in
determining their future.”).
5. See Id. at 238 (“The fact that [civil administration] operations continue to
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Nevertheless, the evolution of international law connected
with “peacebuilding” has not kept pace with on-the-ground
developments. There are two reasons for this gap: (1) the lack of
an institutional framework within the UN to deal with postconflict efforts, and (2) the lack of a clear normative framework
to deal with the justice of conduct after war—both for clarifying
the existing rules (i.e. a modern jus post bellum) and for reasons
of accountability.
The lack of an institutional framework is relevant because
the UN is the organization with both a responsibility for
6
international peace and security and a clear mandate to
7
promote human rights. The problem created by a lack of a
normative framework is twofold. First, given the diversity of
recent post-conflict efforts, the norms of both international
humanitarian law and the law of occupation are often
inapplicable or insufficient. Because the effectiveness and
legitimacy of international law are constantly being challenged,
especially in light of the changed circumstances brought about
8
by the war on terror, it is both necessary and timely to
9
establish a clear normative framework. Second, the normative
framework is related to the question of accountability, a
pervasive issue in international legal debates. The appearance
of a lack of accountability in post-conflict efforts tends to
weaken their legitimacy and efficacy. Therefore, enhancing
accountability mechanisms is a relevant task. These gaps
between theory and practice are inter-related and bridging one
of them requires taking actions to bridge the other. This paper
10
suggests that the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission is
a starting point in this direction, as the Peacebuilding
be managed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . .”).
6. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
7. Human rights are part of the UN Charter (preamble, para 2) but the
central role the organization plays in this area derive from its practice throughout
the years, which can be exemplified by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the sponsorship of several international treaties (such as the
International Covenants on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and Cultural
rights) and its field work. See Id. pmbl, (espousing the common goals that define
members of the U.N.).
8. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN
AFF. May/June 2003, 16, 16 (“[I]t became clear that the grand attempt to subject the
use of force to the rule of law had failed.”).
9. Cf. Id. at 31 (describing variables that need to be taken into account in a
new normative framework for the Security Council).
10. See generally G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005)
(establishing the Peacebuilding Commission).
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Commission may play an important role in both of these areas.
In fact, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission
11
in order to bridge the above-mentioned gaps. It can aid in the
development of a modern jus post bellum by assisting the
creation of a framework of principles and rules for post-conflict
12
efforts. Furthermore, it can enhance accountability by both
adding transparency to post-conflict efforts and by establishing
13
a principled way of assessing these efforts. The area of
accountability is where the Peacebuilding Commission may be
most effective. As posited above, however, because all areas are
inter-related, advancing one aspect of post-conflict efforts means
advancing the legal treatment of all of them.
In order to develop this thesis, this paper is divided into
four sections. The first will briefly describe the history of the
Peacebuilding Commission, highlighting the changes in UN
involvement in post-conflict efforts, including an assessment of
the differences between the proposals made prior to the
Commission’s creation and the body as it was actually created.
The second section will discuss whether the Peacebuilding
Commission can realistically carry out its mandate, given the
gap between theory and practice in the international law of jus
post bellum. The third section will explain how the
Peacebuilding Commission can play the role of doctrinal and
practical gap-filler in the law of jus post bellum by creating a
normative framework for evaluating post-conflict efforts. The
paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the mechanisms of
accountability that the Peacebuilding Commission can use to
enforce the normative framework that this paper proposes.
Above all else, this paper seeks to underline the belief that,
given the right support, the Peacebuilding Commission can
make a meaningful contribution to a modern jus post bellum,
both in terms of theory and practice.

11. See Id. pmbl., para. 2 (outlining the purposes of the Peacebuilding
Commission).
12. See Id. para. 2(c).
13. See Id. para. 13.
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I. THE CREATION OF THE UN’S PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION
A. THE EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES AND RECENT NATURE OF
POST—CONFLICT EFFORTS LED THE UN TO CREATE THE UN
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
The UN was created with the main purpose of establishing
a collective security system that would replace the unilateral
14
use of force by states. It is in order to fulfill this taks that the
Security Council was vested in the role of guardian of
15
international peace and security. The cornerstone of the
16
system was the limitation on the recourse to force. This
approach was based on three underlying factors: (1) respect for
17
the sovereignty of Member States; (2) the idea that the biggest
threat to international peace and security derived from inter18
state conflicts; and (3) a narrow definition of the concept of
19
peace.
With the advent of human rights, globalization, changes in
the concept of sovereignty, and the end of the Cold War, these
underlying factors evolved and the UN approach to
20
international peace and security was forced to adapt. New
concerns arose, such as (1) internal conflicts, (2) the lack of
capacity of some states to protect their own population and to
perform the inherent tasks of governance, and (3) gross and
21
systematic violations of human rights by states. The UN was

14. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 2 (2002) (“[T]he UN Charter . . . is quite clear-eyed
about its intent: to initiate a new global era in which war is forbidden as an
instrument of state policy, but collective security becomes the norm.); David M.
Malone & Ramesh Thakur, UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?, 7 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 11, 12 (2001) (discussing the primary responsibility of the UN).
15. UN Charter preamble para 6; art 1. para 1; art. 2 para 6; and art. 24
16. Id. art. 2, para. 4, art. 51.
17. See Franck, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing the Charter’s treatment of State
Sovereignty).
18. Id. at 20 (discussing the Charter’s treatment of conflict).
19. Id. at 138(discussing a balance between peace and justice).
20. See RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-TORN
TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION 5-8 (2005) (elucidating on the impetus for
increased UN intervention for humanitarian crises).
21. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, at 4-6 (2001) (reporting the findings of the independent Canadian
commission regarding new problems involving international security).
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forced to broaden not only its concept of peace but also its
23
actions on behalf of peace, so as to ensure international peace
and security.
On one hand, the UN began to link peace to economic and
social development—as well as non-discrimination and
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms—thereby
24
addressing not just conflicts themselves but their root causes.
On the other hand, the UN started to perform some functions
that might be characterized as interventions in internal affairs
in the reserved domain of the domestic jurisdiction of the
25
Member States. These activities ranged from monitoring
26
27
elections, to oversight of trust territories, to oversight of peace
28
agreements, to the entire reconstruction of societies, as in the
29
state-building missions in Kosovo and East Timor.
Due to the expansion of their scope, scholars have
categorized such activities into three generations of post-conflict
efforts. According to Simon Chesterman:
[I]n the heady days of the early 1990s, traditional or ‘first generation’
peacekeeping, which was non-threatening and impartial, governed by
22. See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 5-6 (pointing out the inclusion of human
rights abuses as a measure for peace by states).
23. See Id. at 9 (“International intrusiveness, as a consequence, has extended
well beyond coercive intervention . . . .”).
24. E.g., Sonia K. Han, Building a Peace That Lasts: The United Nations and
Post-Civil War PeaceBuilding, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 837, 838 (1994)
(referencing changes in peace-building outlined by UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali).
25. These activities, in fact, are not the domain of domestic jurisdictions, since
it is international law that decides which issues are of its own concern and the UN
organs responsible for peace and security determine whether intervention is
necessary in a given situation following the accepted rule that the UN organs are
responsible for interpreting their own competencies. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (5th ed. 1998) (“[T]he rule that a state cannot
plead provisions of its own law or deficiencies in that law in answer to a claim
against it for an alleged breach of its obligations under international law . . . .”).
26. E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Iraq Special Representative Tells
Security Council “We have grounds for optimism” Following Recent Successful
Provincial Elections, U.N. Press Release SC/9602 (Feb. 26, 2009) (“[T]he elections
have been a flagship of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq . . . .”).
27. For instance in the cases of what are now Togo and Ghana. CHESTERMAN,
supra note 2, at40.
28. E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes
Deployment of United Nations-African Union ‘Hybrid’ Peace Operation in Bid to
Resolve Darfur Conflict, U.N. Press Release SC/9089 (July 31, 2007) (“The Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized UNAMID to
take the necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement
. . . .”).
29. Han, supra note 24, at 839.
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the principles of consent and minimum force, was swiftly succeeded by
two further generations. Second generation or ‘multidimensional’
peacekeeping was used to describe post-cold war operations in
Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Angola, but, retrospectively,
might also have included the Congo operation in 1960–4. Third
generation peacekeeping, sometimes called ‘peace enforcement’,
operating under a chapter VII mandate, began with the Somalia
operation. The genealogy was curious—the third generation appearing
a mere six months after the second—but the terminology also
misleadingly suggested a linear development in peacekeeping
30
doctrine.

This broadening of the organizational mandate and
obligations changed the face of post-conflict efforts undertaken
31
by the UN. As Chesterman points out, these changes were not
met with an adequate doctrine or an adequate internal
32
structure within the UN. This led to redundant efforts and lack
of coordination.
In addition, the fundamental link between peacekeeping
33
and peacebuilding was acknowledged theoretically, and the
perception that focusing on prevention could lead to effectively
34
diminishing the number of conflicts arose. Both concepts
contributed to positive change in UN post-conflict efforts, but
also created difficulties for a system already lacking uniformity.
This situation was perceived to be problematic insofar as it
became clear that the UN involvement in post-conflict efforts
would recur for the foreseeable future and that the organization
35
needed to be prepared to act adequately. Moreover, the fact
that post-conflict efforts were always undertaken on an ad hoc
basis without a holistic approach helped to emphasize the need
30.
31.

CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 238.
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, From Congo to East Timor in Forty Years: The
UN Finally Crossing the Rubicon Between Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making?, 4
NEWCASTLE L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1999); Ivan Šimonović, Post-Conflict Peace Building:
The New Trends, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO., Summer 2003, at 251, 254.
32. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. (“[W]ith some members of the Council and
the wider UN community apparently allergic to the development of doctrine.”).
33. See Ademola Abass, Book Review, 7 J. Conflict & Security L. 137 (2002)
(“[T]he UN realized that peacekeeping and peace-building is tantamount to merely
providing a reprieve for parties to regroup and go back to the battlefield at a future
date.”).
34. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 21, at XI.
See Šimonović, supra note 31, at 256 (speaking to the importance of peace-building
efforts after conflict to prevent it from occurring again).
35. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. See generally Rep. of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared
responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (detailing an exhaustive study of
UN obligations and recommendations on how to meet them).
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for change in the UN. The UN always seemed to be reacting to
37
crises in a “practice-leading-the-theory approach.”
Hence, internal actions were necessary to rectify this
situation. However, there was opposition to such actions based
on the fear that the more the UN prepared to act, the more the
38
organization would be asked to act. Absent consensus on
whether, when, and how this involvement should take place, it
was argued that the organization should refrain from further
39
actions. Despite such opposition, the view that the UN would
be involved in post-conflict efforts, with or without a clear
40
consensus on the nature of its involvement, prevailed. The UN
began to acknowledge that it had a unique role to play in
connection with peacebuilding, and that it needed to undertake
41
actions to rectify its previous failures.
Beginning the assessment of the situation, the Report of the
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change stated that:
Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in
the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse
and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war
to peace . . . . The United Nations unique role in this area arises from
its international legitimacy; the impartiality of its personnel; its
ability to draw on personnel with broad cultural understanding and
experience of a wide range of administrative systems, including in the
developing world; and its recent experience in organizing transitional
42
administration and transitional authority operations.

This analysis led to the creation of a Peacebuilding
36. See Malone, supra note 14, at 12 (“The Security Council must move beyond
its current pattern of reaction and address potential crises holistically and at their
origin before violence breaks out.”). See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 45
(indicating underlying reasons for ad hoc efforts).
37. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
38. See Id., at 55-56, 238 (“[T]he Secretariat faces an unpleasant dilemma: to
assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare
for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or to
prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well
prepared.”).
39. Id. at 238 (remarking on the ambivalent stance on post conflict operations
within the Secretariat).
40. Id. at 55 (“Despite the ‘evident ambivalence’ among member states and
within the UN Secretariat, the Report noted that the circumstances that demand
such operations were likely to recur . . .”).
41. See, for instance, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
supra note 35, in which “ways of strengthening the United Nations to provide
collective security for the twenty-first century” are proposed..
42. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 35, paras.
261-262.
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Commission in order to bridge the gap within the UN regarding
post-conflict efforts.
The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change first proposed the creation of the
Peacebuilding Committee in a report entitled “A More Secure
43
World: Our Shared Responsibility.” It was formally adopted by
the Secretary-General in his report “In Larger Freedom:
44
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,”
45
approved by the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and was
followed in General Assembly and Security Council
46
resolutions, thus becoming a reality.
B. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION, AS PROPOSED, DIFFERS
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE COMMISSION AS ACTUALLY
ESTABLISHED
The proposed and the established Peacebuilding
47
Commission are different in several ways, most notably that
the latter seems to be weaker than the former. The proposed
organ was to have a small membership, formed by experts, with
48
early warning capacities and with a new line of resources. The
established organ, however, lost these characteristics during the
negotiation process, mainly due to the zeal with which Member
49
States guard their sovereignty, the endemic problem of funds
in the UN, and the fact that it was part of a bigger reform
proposal, in which negotiations are based on leverage and
50
compromise.
The established Peacebuilding Commission meets in two
43.
44.

Id. , para. 263.
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights For All: Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 116, U.N.
Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005).
45. World Summit Outcome, supra note 1, para. 97.
46. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶1; S.C. Res. 1645, ¶1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
47. All the differences stem from the analysis of the organ proposed by the
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled “A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility and the organ established by UN Doc
A/RES/60/180. Compare High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
supra note 35, with G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10.
48. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 35,
para. 261.
49. Simon Chesterman, Course at NYU School of Law, Selected Problems in
United Nations Law: State-Building, Governance, and Accountability (April 17,
2006).
50. Id.
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forms: an organizational committee and country-specific
51
committees. The organizational committee is the permanent
structure of the Peacebuilding Commission and encompasses
52
members from within and outside the UN. From within the
UN, the Peacebuilding Commission is made up of: 1) the five
permanent members of the Security Council—China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom and United States; 2) two other
53
annually elected members of the Security Council, currently
54
Mexico and Gabon; 3) seven members of the Economic and
Social Council elected by that body, currently Australia, Brazil,
55
Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Poland and Republic of Korea;
4) five top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to
the UN, currently, Germany, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands
56
and Sweden; 5) five top providers of military and civilian
assistance to UN missions, currently Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
57
Nigeria and Pakistan; and 6) seven members elected by the
58
General Assembly, currently Benin, Chile, Czech Republic,
59
Peru, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The Peacebuilding
51.
52.
53.

G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7.
Id. ¶¶ 4, 8.
S.C. Res. 1646, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1646 (Dec. 20, 2005). Contra
Organizational Committee Members, UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml (last visit Sep. 24,
2010) (stating that the two rotational members of the Security Council will serve two
years instead of one).
54. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, supra note 53. The first two
countries that were elected were Denmark, replaced by Panama, and Tanzania,
replaced by South Africa. Rep. of the Peacebuilding Comm’n on its first session, UN
Peacebuilding Comm’n, 1st Sess., June 23–June 27, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/62/137–
S/2007/458 (July 25, 2007).
55. Organizational Committee Members, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. G.A. Res. 60/261, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/261 (May 17, 2006) (showing that the
election follows the procedure of the resolution). However, as in the case of the other
mandates, an extension from a one-year to a two-year mandate appears to have
occurred according to the Commission webpage, Organizational Committee
Members, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2010, 6:56PM),
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml.
59. The first group was formed by Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador,
Fiji and Jamaica. Originally, the Peacebuilding Commission had a representative of
the UN Secretary-General (Carolyn McAskie – named on May 16th, 2006) but this
situation seems to no longer exist according to the membership list on the
Commission’s webpage. It seems that there are representatives of the UN SecretaryGeneral directly linked to the Commission’s work on specific countries. See
Organizational Committee Members, UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml (last visited Sept.
16, 2010, 6:56PM); see also Election of Seven Members of the Organizational
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Commission also has seats for representatives of the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other institutional
60
donors.
Even more members are added when the Peacebuilding
61
Commission sits in its country-specific committees. Each
committee will include seats for the country under
consideration, countries in the region that are engaged in postconflict efforts, other countries engaged in relief efforts and
political dialogue, the major financial, troop and civilian police
contributor, the senior UN official in the field, other relevant
UN representatives, and other relevant regional and
62
international financial institutions.
The justification for the size of the committees is the belief
that all the relevant decision-making actors involved in postconflict efforts—including military and economic facets—should
63
be present. This way the Peacebuilding Commission will work
64
as a comprehensive forum in accordance with its mandate.
However, the increase in size may jeopardize the work of the
Peacebuilding Commission, which may become slow and
inefficient due to the fact that its decisions are made by
65
consensus.
The Peacebuilding Commission was created as an advisory
66
body. To aid its functioning, a support office (from within the
67
Secretariat and the existing resources of the UN ) and a
68
Peacebuilding Fund were established. The Peacebuilding Fund
Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission, September 2009, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Sept. 26, 2010, 6:14PM),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22278/election_of_seven_members_of_the_organizatio
nal_committee_of_the_peacebuilding_commission_september_2009.html (describing
the initial elections); Carolyn McAskie of Canada Named to Top-Level Peacebuilding
Support Post, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:24PM),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18509&Cr=peace&Cr1 (discussing
Carolyn McAskie’s appointment to the peacebuilding support post)..
60. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 9.
61. The Peacebuilding Commission is working on the specific cases of Sierra
Leone, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. Besides these States, the Central African
Republic is on the Commission’s agenda. See Peacebuilding Commission Agenda,
U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2010, 4:21PM),
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pbcagenda.shtml.
62. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
63. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
64. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
65. Id. ¶18.
66. Id. ¶ 1.
67. Id. ¶ 23.
68. Id. ¶ 24..
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was established on October 11, 2006, and has a value of more
69
than $348 million, surpassing the intended goal of $250
70
million. The Peacebuilding Commission’s main goals are:
a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and
to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict
peacebuilding recovery; b) to focus attention on the
reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for
recovery from conflict and to support the development of
integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for
sustainable development; c) to provide recommendations and
information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors
within and outside the United Nations, to develop best
practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early
recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by
71
the international community to post-conflict recovery.
The
Peacebuilding
Commission
will
focus
on
“reconstruction,
institution-building
and
sustainable
72
and
development, in countries emerging from conflict”
therefore “is likely to deal only with countries emerging from
conflict, following the establishment of a peace accord and a
73
cessation of violence.” This may be construed to mean that
prevention will not be a major concern of the commission
(although its relevance in relation to prevention of conflicts was
74
highlighted above). The UN justifies this more limited focus
stating that:

69. UN Peacebuilding Fund: Preventing a Relapse Into Violent Conflict, U.N.
PEACEBUILDING FUND (Sept. 16, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml.
70. Annan Launches Peacebuilding Fund to ‘Kick-Start’ Efforts to Rebuild
After Conflict (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.unpbf.org/news-20061011.shtml. As of
February 28, 2010, the Peacebuilding Fund had 46 States, one international
organization, and private donors. See Pledges, Commitments and Deposits, U.N.
PEACEBUILDING FUND (Sept. 16, 2010, 7:24PM),
http://www.unpbf.org/pledges.shtml. Besides the four States on the agenda of the
Peacebuilding Commission, supra note 61 and accompanying text, Comoros, Ivory
Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Nepal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are eligible for
resources. Moreover, in emergency situations of threats to peace, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, and Kenya may be assisted; cf.
Rep. of the Peacebuilding Commission on its First Session, supra note 53.
71. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
72. Peacebuilding Q&A, U.N. INFO. SERV. (Sept. 17, 2010, 6:13 PM),
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/library_2006peacebuildingt.html.
73. Id.
74. E.g., International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
supra note 14, at 19-27.
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The United Nations has played a vital role in mediating peace
agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce
the level of conflict in several regions. However, some of those accords
have failed to take hold, such as in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in
1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back
into violence within five years, driving home the message that, to
prevent conflict, peace agreements must be implemented in a
sustained manner. Yet, to date, no part of the UN system has been
directly responsible for helping countries make the transition from war
to lasting peace. The Peacebuilding Commission will help fill this gap
by facilitating an institutional and systematic connection between
peacekeeping and post-conflict operation and the international
network of assistance and donor mobilization including the World
75
Bank.

Despite this limitation on its focus, the Peacebuilding
Commission can nevertheless contribute to the enhancement of
post-conflict efforts. The following section will describe how it
should make these contributions.
II. CAN THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CARRY OUT
ITS MANDATE?
A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
GAP OF POST—CONFLICT EFFORTS AT THE UN.
As mentioned, one of the underlying reasons for the
creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was the recognition of
an institutional gap within the UN in relation to its post-conflict
76
efforts. The institutional gap is undeniable, but before
assessing whether or not the Peacebuilding Commission will be
able to bridge it, two background issues should be considered:
(1) whether the UN is best suited to oversee jus post bellum
issues, and if it is, (2) whether it could have done so with
existing resources rather than creating a new commission to do
so.
1. The UN is uniquely suited to governing post-conflict efforts.
Why must one focus on the UN as opposed to other
international actors who are also involved in post-conflict
75.
76.

Peacebuilding Q&A, supra note 72, at no. 11.
See Questions and Answers, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2010,
8:49 PM), http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml (the UN itself
recognizes such a gap qualifying it as “huge”).
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efforts, sometimes through unilateral actions? The answer to
this question has both legal and political foundations. Legally
speaking, the UN is primarily responsible for the maintenance
of international peace and security because it is the only
77
organization that can authorize the use of force. It is also the
only universal organization vested with broad responsibilities in
relation to human rights. Given the combination of these two
factors and that post-conflict efforts encompass concerns
relating to both issues, the UN is the appropriate forum to deal
with post-conflict efforts, and should, therefore, be prepared to
act coherently in such situations.
Furthermore, there are three political reasons why the UN
is the proper actor to address the issues of jus post bellum.
Firstly, the UN adds its legitimacy to the post-conflict efforts in
which it is involved, which is important given that the actions it
undertakes may appear to be violations of state sovereignty and,
78
therefore, touch upon national sensitivities. Even when postconflict efforts derive from a conflict that may not have been
authorized by UN, the actors often rely on the UN to assist
them—one prominent example of this being the current
79
situation in Iraq.
Secondly, states are often too willing to involve the UN in
post-conflict efforts because such actions are seldom risk-free.
That is, the involvement of multinational forces may decrease
the death toll of one state’s army. At the same time, UN
involvement may lend credibility to the action being
undertaken, which may provide political justification for the loss
80
of lives.
77.
78.

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, 2; art. 2, para. 3, 4; art. 24, art. 51.
The UN has to deal with national sensitivities in all aspects of its work.
From the type of food that can be handed in humanitarian emergencies to the dress
codes in some societies to the situations involved in post-conflict efforts. An example
of such situation is described by Simon Chesterman: “A measure of the speed with
which the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was established is the
name itself. UN operations typically operate under an acronym, but 'UNIAMIK' was
dismissed as too much of a mouthful. 'UNIAK' sounded like a cross between 'eunuch'
and 'maniac'—associations judged unlikely to help the mission. 'UNMIK' was the
final choice, having the benefits of being short, punchy, and clear: only in English,
however. Once the operation was on the ground, it was discovered that anmik, in the
dialect of Albanian spoken in Kosovo, means 'enemy'. No one within the United
Nations was aware of the confusion until it was too late, at which point instructions
went out to pronounce the acronym 'oon-mik.'” CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 236.
79. The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, WORLD PRESS
REVIEW ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2010, 4:42 PM), http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq.
80. More recently this was seen in the attempt of the US to engage the UN in
the activities in Iraq, both in the context of administration and of peace-keeping, and
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Finally, given its multicultural composition, the UN can be
seen as being better suited to undertake such missions because
it is perceived to be more culturally and historically sensitive.
Such perception is not only an essential element for the success
of any mission but is also indispensable in structuring the
81
operation and the actions in the first place. The importance of
considering the cultural and historical background of each
territory before acting is also one of the reasons why it is
impossible to have a one-size-fits-all post-conflict package. Postconflict efforts must adapt to local practices, customs and
82
83
traditions. This flexibility is essential, not only to avoid
colonialist or imperialist models, but also to apply, in practice,
the idea of human rights. Nonetheless, the balance between
effectiveness and cultural sensitivity adds to the difficulty of
post-conflict efforts and is a reason why the UN, as an
organization with experience in post-conflict situations, is
politically the best choice to undertake them.
2. Given the complexity of existing agencies, the most efficient
option was to create the Peacebuilding Commission to govern
post-conflict efforts.
The second issue is whether or not a new organ within the
UN was necessary to the goal of bridging the institutional gap
connected with post-conflict efforts, or whether a novel approach
to existing organs would have sufficed.
Due to the similarities in the post-conflict efforts
undertaken by the UN, especially in relation to international
administration of territories and the work that the organization
has done in pushing decolonization efforts forward (namely the
organization acting on behalf and in the interest of the people of
a territory with a view to fostering the development of
conditions for self-actions), some commentators have argued
that the UN Trusteeship Council could be the organ to bridge
even in the face of the debate of whether or not the invasion was legal under
international law. See, e.g., John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 736
(2004) (discussing the conventional wisdom concerning the legitimacy of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in connection with the UN’s power to authorize the use of force).
81. See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 12-15; see also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at
4-5.
82. See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 20; CHESTERMAN, supra note 2..
83. It’s interesting to note that the concept of flexibility is sometimes seen as
malleability, which is seen as a negative approach as it may lead to “justified”
violations. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
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84

the institutional gap of the organization. Such a proposal has
two positive aspects. Firstly, the Trusteeship Council is an
organ that already exists and reactivation would be far less
complicated than the process of creating a whole new body.
Secondly, because the Trusteeship Council was involved in
85
decolonization efforts, it already has some expertise of acting
in similar situations and could learn from its own mistakes.
However, the negative aspects of re-activating the
Trusteeship Council outweigh the positive ones. Firstly, because
the organization was once responsible for decolonization efforts,
its role in post-conflict efforts might be viewed suspiciously by
former colonies for whom the memory of colonization is still too
86
fresh. Secondly, the UN charter would need to be amended to
enable the Trusteeship Council to deal with the current and
future post-conflict efforts because this document imposes
limitations on which states can be subjected to the Trusteeship
87
88
Council —excluding any member of the UN. Given that nearly
89
all countries in the world are members of the UN, for the
Trusteeship Council to be able to function, an amendment would
certainly be required. This would be a political nightmare: once
the UN Charter is open for amendment, it is impossible to
predict the range of the changes it might undergo, as changes
are possible in every single article. Thus, the creation of a new
organ—the Peacebuilding Commission—was a better choice
than adapting and reinitiating the Trusteeship Council.

84. See generally Brian Deiwert, A New Trusteeship for World Peace and
Security: Can an Old League of Nations Idea be Applied to a Twenty-First Century
Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771; Saira Mohamed, From Keeping Peace to
Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2005) (advancing suggestions for how a revived
Trusteeship Council could support peacebuilding efforts).
85. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 37-47 (describing the history of the UN
from its founding to Timor Leste).
86. This highlights the importance of an international organization like the UN
being responsible for post-conflict efforts. See Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposals for UN
Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 633 no. 13 (“A UN ‘administering
authority’ could better dispel the well-justified suspicion that arises whenever an
individual state acts in that capacity; such a state is often suspected of using the
trusteeship system (and its predecessor, the mandate system of the League of
Nations era) as a cloak for the promotion of its selfish colonial interests”).
87. U.N. Charter art. 76.
88. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 47, 55.
89. See Member States of the United Nations (Sept. 15, 2010, 4:16 PM),
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (listing the 192 States that are members
of the UN).
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B. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS TO EXPECT THAT THE
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS
MANDATE
Though the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was
likely the best choice to promote a new legal framework for jus
post bellum, it is not without problems. At the institutional
level, the main obstacle to be overcome is the fact that the
Peacebuilding Commission only has recommendatory powers,
which means that it can only try to persuade relevant actors to
90
act, which can limit the political force of its acts. Furthermore,
the Peacebuilding Commission may only act after a request for
advice from the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General, the
General Assembly, and the UN Economic and Social Council
91
(when the Security Council is not seized of the matter), or from
a Member State regarding the Member State’s own situations if
92
the issue is not on the Security Council agenda. The
combination of these two features suggests that the
Peacebuilding Commission may have limited room for
independent action. Additionally, it could mean that when it
acts, its recommendations will lack force.
Nevertheless, there are at least five reasons for optimism
regarding the influence of the Peacebuilding Commission.
Firstly, the Secretary-General can ask for recommendations by
the Peacebuilding Commission independently of whether or not
93
the matter is under consideration by the Security Council. This
is relevant since the role of the Secretary-General has evolved
throughout the years from the position of a chief administrator
of the UN to a more active figure in world politics, helping to set
94
global agenda. This means that if a particular SecretaryGeneral gives considerable weight to post-conflict efforts and
relies on the Peacebuilding Commission, there will be room for
95
active work on the part of the Commission. The inverse would
90.
91.
92.
93.

G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2(c).
Respecting, therefore Article 12 of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 12.
G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 12.
General Assembly Resolution 60/180 does not establish limits to the
requests of the Secretary General to the Commission. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 7,
¶ 12.
94. See generally Paul Szasz, The Role of the UN Secretary-General: Some Legal
Aspects, 24 NYU J. INT’L. L. & POL. 161 (1991); Ian Johnstone, The Role of the UN
Secretary General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
441 (2003).
95. Bruce Jones, N.Y.U. L. Sch., Lessons from the Field, Lecture Given for the
Selected Problems in United Nations Law: State-Building, Governance, and
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also be true, of course, if a particular Secretary-General places
less importance on post-conflict efforts. However, given the fact
that post conflict operations in general are closely linked to the
three basic values of the organization—security, human rights
and development—there is reason to believe that the
96
Secretaries-General will remain focused on peacebuilding.
Secondly, all the Permanent Members of the Security
Council are part of the Peacebuilding Commission which works
97
This means that for a
on the basis of consensus.
recommendation of the Peacebuilding Commission to pass, it
must be approved (or at least not opposed) by the Permanent
Members of the Security Council. This is relevant not only
because of the veto power of the Permanent Members of the
98
Security Council, but also because the Security Council is the
primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international
99
peace and security. Because post-conflict efforts are an
essential element of international peace and security, thus
100
if a
falling under the mandate of the Security Council,
measure is backed by influential members of the Security
Council, and especially by the permanent members, the
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission will have
significant backing.
Thirdly, given that the post-conflict efforts occur throughout
various regions in the world, and that States’ interests are
dynamically intertwined, it is in the interest of all States to
have a normative framework established for future actions,
especially if they are able to join in the effort of creating such a
framework. That is, it is in the best interest of all states to
support the Peacebuilding Commission, because post-conflict
efforts have the potential to have a significant effect on every
State. Even if a State does not feel the aftereffects of a conflict
directly, it likely will experience the effects of regional
instability if a neighbor is subject to such a conflict.
Fourthly, it has been argued that the United States, not
101
being well-suited for post-conflict efforts itself, could benefit
Accountability Course at New York University School of Law (Apr. 20, 2006).
96. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, §B, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005
(Mar. 21, 2005).
97. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶¶ 4(a), 18.
98. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
99. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
100. Mathias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the
International Community, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 616- 620 (2001).
101. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 253.
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from the UN’s experience in post-conflict efforts and learn from
102
its successes. After 9/11, the United States was the most
103
adversarial State to a strong UN. Today, the United States is
considered the only remaining national super-power and the
majority of post-conflict efforts involve either the UN or the
104
United States. Given these facts and the reality that States
105
are motivated by national interests, one could say that it is in
the best interest of the United States to have a strong
Peacebuilding Commission to implement the international law
106
of jus post bellum. The support of the United States would
enhance the chances of effective recommendations by the

102. Seth G. Jones & James Dobbins, UN Reform: The UN's Record in Nation
Building, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 723 (2006); Jones and Dobbins have drawn the following
comparative table, Table 1, which shows that UN led missions are more successful
than US led missions. Id. at 718.
Table 1. Nation-building outcomes
Country
Peaceful in 2005
Democratic in 2005
Congo

No

No

Namibia

Yes

Yes

El Salvador

Yes

Yes

UN-Led Missions Cambodia

Yes

No

Mozambique

Yes

Yes

Eastern Slavonia

Yes

Yes

Sierra Leone*

Yes

Yes

East Timor*

Yes

Yes

West Germany

Yes

Yes

Japan

Yes

Yes

Somalia (UNITAF)

No

No

No

No

Bosnia*

Yes

Yes

Kosovo*

Yes

Yes

Afghanistan*

No

?

Iraq*

No

?

US-Led Missions Haiti

* = Ongoing Operation
Which shows that UN led missions are more successful than US led missions. Id. at
718.
103. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 10-11.
104. Jones & Dobbins, supra note 102, at 722.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see generally Chesterman, supra note 2, at 253-56 (contending that the
United States should implement peace building efforts in order to extend its
influence).
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107

Peacebuilding Commission.
Finally, even if the optimal scenario does not become a
reality, the Peacebuilding Commission could employ techniques
used by organs with similar problems, such as the Human
Rights Commission and the human rights treaty bodies. For
example, naming and shaming tends to produce results—even if
108
limited—in international politics. These strategies rely upon
the needs of states to be perceived as legitimate and ruleabiding in the sense that soft power is relevant to international
109
law and international relations. Thus, even if a legal sanction
is not possible, the fact that a state is listed as “not playing the
game correctly” could lead to a change in its practice and an
110
increased reverence towards the rules.
Apart from these five reasons for optimism in relation to the
Peacebuilding Commission, one could argue that a limitation on
the legal status of its actions, for instance the ability to pass
recommendations rather than create hard law, is not a problem
at all since it may assist in the operation of this organ. This is
due to the fact that doctrine has followed practice in this area,
meaning that there is no doctrinal consensus on post-conflict
111
efforts on which the Peacebuilding Commission can rely.
Accordingly, the doctrine might have a more flexible approach to
evolving circumstances than it would if its proposals were to
become more than recommendations.
On the other hand, some countries are still wary of legally
binding norms in post-conflict efforts, let alone strong doctrinal
112
concepts themselves. Therefore, having an organ such as the
Peacebuilding Commission, with persuasive power linked to the
113
“diversity and relevance of all those participating,” might be
more palatable to those countries suspicious of legally binding
norms generally held by organs with stronger powers.
Another obstacle at the institutional level is that the
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission have lower
priority in international law than the recommendations of other
107.
108.

Jones & Dobbins, supra note 102, at 722-23.
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 93 (1st ed. 2004).
109. Id. at 143-46.
110. Id.
111. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
112. Id. at 118-19.
113. See UN Peacebuilding Comm’n, Questions and Answers, THE UNITED
NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
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114

organs. As a result, the recommendations of the Peacebuilding
115
Commission would have limited legal force, diminishing their
effectiveness. Since the effectiveness of any recommendations
116
depends on which organ of the UN acts upon them, it may
turn out that the best application of the Peacebuilding
Commission’s recommendations may be as a tool for principled
117
Regardless of whether the Commission’s
evaluation.
recommendations are undertaken, at the very least they would
serve as a way to evaluate and improve accountability.
However, if the Security Council acts on the Peacebuilding
Commission’s recommendations, the recommendations would
have the effect of something more than just a tool for principled
118
evaluation. Under those circumstances, the legal force of the
proposals comes from one of two sources. The Security Council
could pass a resolution under the authority granted to it by
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which establishes the Security
Council’s authority to maintain international peace and
119
security. Furthermore, successive resolutions of the Security
120
Council are often read together to form customary law. Thus,
even if Chapter VII of the UN Charter did not apply to a
particular resolution, the recommendations of the Peacebuilding
Commission would still have some legal force if the Security
Council acted on them. This is especially true given that the
primary responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain
121
international peace and security.
There are two other potentially meaningful ways that the
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission would have
114. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 52-59 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (providing information on the sources of international
law, especially the acts of international organization).
115. See generally Id. at 52-53 (finding the limited legal force of the
recommendations to be derived from the assumption, that for the time being, the
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission would not be codified in a treaty
sponsored by the UN. Even if the treaty did come into existence it would not have
universal acceptance).
116. See Id. at 53 (proposing that the decisions of the International Court of
Justice and the resolutions of the Security Council on international peace and
security, when taken under Chapter VII, have stronger legal force than other acts of
the UN).
117. Id.
118. U.N. Charter art. 25, art. 103.
119. See generally Id. at art. 39-51 (according to art. 25, any resolution made
under Chapter VII is binding on all UN members, and therefore, has legal force).
120. This is the idea behind the claim of the existence of a right to humanitarian
assistance. ALBERTO DO AMARAL, JR., O DIREITO DE ASSISTÊNCIA HUMANITARIA (2003)
121. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, at art. 39-51.
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legal force. If the General Assembly acts on the Peacebuilding
Commission’s recommendations, the recommendations might be
ascribed both moral and political power. This can be attributed
to the sheer gravity of the General Assembly’s influence, in
which all state members of the UN are included and entitled to
122
one vote. If this occurred, there would likely be a push for
compliance based on the international support for the
resolution, as evidenced by the resolution’s adoption by the
General Assembly. International democratic approval would
enhance the legal force of the recommendations, at least in the
sense that the practice could become international custom if the
states were to follow it with a conviction of its mandatory
character. To the contrary, if the Secretary-General or the
Economic and Social Council act on the recommendation, its
effectiveness will likely be limited because of the relative lack of
123
political power vested in these organs.
Similar to other issues of international law, the outcome of
the Peacebuilding Commission’s recommendations will depend
most on the political will of the states and other international
actors. However, the Peacebuilding Commission has all the
necessary elements to fulfill the institutional gaps of jus post
bellum within the UN, and any institutional problems are not
insurmountable.
III. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN FILL THE
EXISTING NORMATIVE GAPS IN POST-CONFLICT
EFFORTS
Though the previous sections establish that the
Peacebuilding Commission can bridge the institutional gap in
post-conflict efforts by the UN, the question remains whether it
can also play a role in closing the normative gap. This normative
gap is twofold and encompasses both the need to develop a legal
framework—for instance, a modern jus post bellum—and the
need to enhance accountability mechanisms for post-conflict
efforts.

122.
123.

Id. at art. 9, art. 18.
Id. at art. 61. However, in the same way as in the case of the General
Assembly, moral and political force can exist and make a difference.
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A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND JUS POST BELLUM
The regulation of war has been a theme of interest to
124
international law since its beginning. Initially, the focus was
on the justice of war, in which the debate surrounded the issue
125
of whether a war was being fought under just motives. The
idea underpinning just war theories is to limit the occurrence of
war by establishing criteria that would limit the circumstances
126
under which a war could be justified. The belief was that war
is inherent to the international scenario, and although total
elimination of war is not possible, some limitation is necessary
127
and beneficial. This theory gave rise to jus ad bellum, or the
right to go to war.
As time passed and the theories of the law of war developed,
an additional standard arose. With the evolution of warfare
128
came the recognition that civilians too were victims of war.
Consequently, a second set of limitations to war arose: jus in
bello, referring to the restrictions on targets, weapons and types
of conduct and imposing obligations on belligerents during
129
war.
These two sets of limitations form the core of international
humanitarian law and are codified in the Hague Regulations of
130
131
1907, the four Geneva Conventions, and their Protocols of

124. See generally HUGO GROTUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., vol. 2 1925) (providing various historical perspectives regarding
the laws of war).
125. See, e.g., RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 53 (1st ed., 1999)
(frowning upon warfare for glory and advancement, but justifying war for the
principle of governing inferiors).
126. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 62 (3d ed. 2000) (limiting the justification of war to
circumstances when there is a wrong received); G.F.S. Soares, Legitimidade de uma
Guerra Preventia em Pleno 2003? POLITICA EXTERNA, Summer 2003, at 8 – 9.
127. See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 125, at 11 (limiting war to instances where there
is a need for a preemptive strike against an adversary, or acts committed on the
basis of fear).
128. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, art. 13-26, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (defining and establishing
protections for civilians during war).
129. See Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J.
55 (1984), for a summary of the main international humanitarian law obligations.
130. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/intro/195?OpenDocument [hereinafter Hague
Regulations].
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132

1949 and 1977, respectively. With the end of the Cold War, the
increase in ethnic conflicts, and the existence of “failed states,”
133
reflecting concerns
just war theory made a comeback,
134
This revival of just war
regarding post-conflict events.
135
136
theory, in connection with post-conflict events, led to the
137
theory of jus post bellum.
Jus post bellum is relevant because the formal end to a
conflict oftentimes does not typify the post-conflict situation in
138
the territories where the war was fought. For example, the
winner of a war rarely exits the territory after the end of the
conflict, but, on the contrary, often stays and imposes its
139
authority. The winner’s seemingly permanent presence and
control over the loser’s territory and affairs gives rise to
140
obligations on the part of the former under jus post bellum.
131. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 128, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
132. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609. It is interesting to note that in 2005 a third protocol was created,
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 558.
133. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1615, 1620 (2006).
134. Recent Publications, 118 HARV. L. REV.524 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL
WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR (2004)).
135. Teitel, supra note 133, at 1620.
136. HARV. L. REV., supra note 134, at 524.
137. See generally Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition:
Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 132-40 (2005) (defining jus post
bellum as the seeking of justice after a war or conflict. It is believed to comprise
both the ideas of trials and accountability after a war (and therefore be linked to
international criminal tribunals) and with the obligations for a state that stays in
an occupied territory).
138. See Inger Osterdahl, What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine
Bottles and Old, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 175, 176 (2009) (using the example of
the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, in which each side defends a
different legal framework for the territories they dispute).
139. More recently this was seen in Iraq, given that the two main goals—the
search for weapons of mass destruction and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein--were
achieved early in the conflict, yet the United States stayed on.
140. DiMeglio, supra note 139, at 150.
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Immanuel Kant was among the earliest proponents of this
141
theory, and the views he espoused were later codified in the
142
law of occupation. Although the law of occupation developed
significantly beyond its early stages, the law of occupation is
143
still seen as part of the law of war. Accordingly, the law of
occupation is regulated in both the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions, which establish a “bill of rights for the
occupied population” by imposing obligations on an occupying
144
Notwithstanding these regulations, the law of
power.
occupation is insufficient to regulate modern post-conflict
efforts. There are three reasons for the law of occupation’s
insufficiency.
Firstly, the law of occupation is a fundamental part of the
broader regulations of the law of war. This overlap is
problematic because the exercise of control over a foreign
territory occurs in many situations, and is not isolated to
145
circumstances following a formal war. It is also problematic
because the law of war focuses primarily on the conduct of a
146
However, some of the post-conflict efforts are
state.
147
undertaken not by states but by international organizations.
Secondly, the provisions underlying jus post bellum are
historically dated. Since the regulations pre-date the emergence
of an international system of human rights, they do not reflect
148
the obligations imposed by this branch of international law.
Instead the regulations impose very limited obligations on the
149
occupying power. Furthermore, because the role of the state
150
has evolved since the advent of the welfare state, the duties
imposed by the existing norms do not match the perceived

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 133.
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3-5 (1993).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 132, art. 42–56 (imposing
restrictions on the actions of occupying state forces).
147. As in the cases of Kosovo and Timor Leste, in which the UN was the main
actor in post-conflict efforts.
148. For example, the Hague Regulations of 1907 predated the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by forty-one years.
149. BENVENISTI, supra note 142, at 7 (“Very few words are used to describe
both the nature of the occupation regime and the scope of the occupant’s legitimate
powers.”).
150. Nina Beatriz Ranieri, Do Estado Liberal ao Estado Contemporâneo: Notas
sobre os processos de exaustão dos modelos políticos e da ordem jurídica, 36 REVISTA
DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL E INTERNACIONAL, 135 (2001) (Braz.).
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duties of the state. This is because such norms were created in a
time when states, following a philosophy of political liberalism,
151
avoided interference in private activity. Today, however, the
state is more involved in the economic and social life of its
152
citizens. As a result, the modern role and obligation of the
state effectively weakens the traditional form of the law of
occupation.
The final problem is a practical one. Even though
153
most
occupation is a fact rather than a legal concept,
occupying powers do not recognize their status as such. Rather,
the occupying power tries to avoid such a label, and thus the
application of the law of occupation and any resulting limitation
154
to their conduct. Simply put, the law of occupation does not
suffice to adequately regulate modern post-conflict efforts.
Regardless of whether one interprets such law teleologically or
historically for purposes of providing guidance or establishing
155
minimum requirements for post-conflict obligations, there is
still a need for more comprehensive and specific regulations. In
response, it seems that the idea of a modern jus post bellum has
156
started to gain momentum once more.
Although there are controversies about who was the first to
157
propose the re-instatement of jus post bellum, the relevant
aspect is the recognition that international law should be
concerned with the justice of what happens in post-conflict
efforts. Though there is no direct mention of the development of
158
a jus post bellum in the Peacebuilding Commission’s Mandate,
there are several reasons why the development of jus post
bellum could aid the Peacebuilding Commission in reaching its

151.
152.
153.

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 476-78 (expanded ed. 2005).
BENVENISTI, supra note 142, at 209-10.
Eyal Benvenisti, Applicability of the Law of Occupation, 99 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L
L. 29, 29 (2005).
154. Id. at 29-30.
155. Id. at 30.
156. Cf. WALZER, supra note 126, at xi (“But there has been one large and
momentous shift in both wars and words. The issues that I discussed under the
name ‘intervention’ (chapter 6), which were peripheral to the main concerns of the
book, have moved dramatically into the center.”).
157. Compare Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post
Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285,
289 (2005) (emphasizing Michael Walzer’s book JUST AND UNJUST WARS, published
in 1977, which addressed questions of post-conflict reconstruction ) with DiMeglio,
supra note 137, at 133 (attributing Michael Schuck as the first to unequivocally
reference jus post bellum).
158. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10.
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main purposes.
Firstly, the Peacebuilding Commission is an ideal forum to
confront the issue of a uniform normative framework because its
centralized authority makes it capable of gathering each of the
159
relevant parties involved in post-conflict efforts. Secondly, the
law of jus post bellum can contribute to create common
160
acting as a unifying force within
objectives and values,
potentially
divisive
multi-cultural
and
multi-ethnic
international scenarios. Finally, norms will, at the very least,
minimize anarchy and, at the most, allow for the co-existence
161
and cooperation of States in the international scenario.
The need to respond to these concerns became especially
clear in the wake of the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq. In those scenarios the relevant post-conflict efforts were to
be undertaken by other international actors in addition to the
162
U.S., sometimes with the direct involvement of the UN, but
163
sometimes with its opposition. These scenarios highlight the

159. Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml (last accessed Sept. 22, 2010)
(One of the Mandate’s goals is, “[t]o bring together all relevant actors to marshal
resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict
peacebuilding and recover.”).
160. See generally TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATION OF
STATES 16 (1983) (“To understand international society as an association of states in
terms of common rules is not to deny that states often cooperate to promote shared
purposes or that they desire to realize these purposes is an important factor in
motivating them to observe existing forms and usages.”).
161. AMARAL, JR., supra note 120, at 47.
162. See e.g., U.N./World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, Oct. 2003,
available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf
(discussing the involvement of several international organizations such as the U.N.,
the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in the reconstruction of
Iraq).
163. See generally NewsHour Extra, The Role of the United Nations in a Postwar
Iraq (Apr. 7, 2003),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf
(describing how leaders of other countries criticized the U.S. for not creating a more
“international postwar Iraq,” particularly that the United Nations did not play a
larger role). Here, one can recall the invasion of Iraq in which the US was able to
form a coalition with other States – such as the UK and Spain – but failed to obtain
a specific authorization of the UN Security Council to act. See generally Anthony
Dworkin, Would War Be Lawful Without Another U.N. Resolution?, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJECT (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq2.html
(“In his press conference on March 6, President Bush was asked whether the United
States would be seen as defiant of the United Nations if it launched a war against
Iraq without explicit authorization from the Security Council. ‘As we head into the
21st century, when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s
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need for a normative framework to minimize even potential
violations of international law and underscore the importance of
principles of justice and legitimacy in post-conflict efforts. In
addition, such changes would also enormously aid in enhancing
accountability, which in turn maximizes the perception of
legitimacy of the UN and of international law as a system.
Finally, because the Peacebuilding Commission has among
its tasks the proposal of integrated strategies and the
164
improvement of coordination, finding a common language of
action is not only useful but is indispensable. Furthermore, the
fact that there is no consensus on the political or moral grounds
for interventions and for post-conflict efforts suggests that a
common normative framework is the best way to proceed.
Because the existing normative framework for post-conflict
efforts is not enough, the Peacebuilding Commission can and
should play an important role in developing a new legal
structure in this area.
B. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A MODERN JUS POST BELLUM MUST
ADDRESS THREE ISSUES
The downsides of the Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate
have been discussed at length: primarily that it has a narrower
mandate than is ideal, and it is too soon to predict its real
165
Nevertheless, if the
impact on post-conflict efforts.
Peacebuilding Commission is capable of setting a normative
framework for post-conflict efforts and can aid the development
of a modern jus post bellum, its contribution to international
law could be significant. The task of setting this normative
framework, however, needs to address the source, the language
and the content of a modern jus post bellum.
1. The Source of Jus Post Bellum
The first question related to the creation of a modern
normative framework for jus post bellum concerns the source of
the obligations for post-conflict actors. It is well established, at

permission,’ the President replied.”).
164. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, at 2.
165. Accord Gerhard Thallinger, The UN Peacebuilding Commission and
Transitional Justice, 8 GERMAN L.J. 681, 692 (2007) (declaring the uncertainty of
whether the UN Peacebuilding Commission will maintain its “narrow, imprecise
framework” in the future).
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the very least, that some kind of obligation arises in connection
with the efforts of post-conflict actors. In fact, the obligation is
166
recognized both within and without the UN. The Report of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the
United Nations clearly stated the existence of such an obligation
when it said, “today, in an era when dozens of States are under
stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international
obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to
167
perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.”
The conduct of the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq
supports the claim that some obligation towards the local
168
population exists.
It is, therefore, a fairly settled international norm that a
post-conflict actor is under obligations as to its behavior after a
169
formal conflict has ceased. But, this raises a further issue as
to the nature of these obligations. The first relates to the precise
point at which such obligations arise. One could say that there
are two possible options: either there is a more fixed criterion,
meaning that the obligation arises once a certain objective
threshold is met or one works with a more malleable criterion in
which the obligations arise based on the exigency of a particular
situation. Put another way, should the obligations arise after
the existence of effective control of the territory? Or should they
arise once an international actor gets involved in a conflict
situation that might lead to a post-conflict effort for which
obligations already exist and are just subjected to a subsequent
condition?
If the threshold approach is chosen, a concomitant issue is
whether this threshold should be defined by legal or practical
170
standards. This is relevant because, as discussed above, most
occupying powers deny every claim of occupation, so as to avoid

166. Cf. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A
Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 119, 120 (2010) (describing the increasing involvement of international actors in
reconstruction efforts).
167. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra
note 35, at 69.
168. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 130–32 (Feb. 2, 2005) (exemplifying the U.S’s commitment to
continue seeking peace and freedom for the Iraqi people).
169. See Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
supra note 35, at 69.
170. See discussion supra Part III.A
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171

the application of the law of occupation. If one focuses on postconflict efforts undertaken by the UN, this is also relevant.
Since the organization is not keen on ascribing any conceptual
definition to the actions it is undertaking, as will be seen
172
it is unclear which obligations apply in a given
below,
situation.
2. The Language of Jus Post Bellum
The awkwardness with which the UN conceptualizes its
post-conflict efforts leads to another issue that needs to be
addressed in the establishment of a modern jus post bellum. In
the area of post-conflict efforts, there are several concepts that,
although sometimes intertwined, are not used with precision.
173
Post-conflict
efforts
can
encompass
peace-making,
174
175
176
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, nation-building, and state177
building, and it is important to clarify each of these terms in
178
order to clarify the specific obligations in each of this areas.
171.
172.
173.

Benvenisti, supra note 140, at 189–90.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2
The UN describes peacemaking as, “the peaceful resolution of armed
conflict around the word.” Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention,
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking (last visited
Sept. 23, 2010).
174. The UN defines peace-keeping as “a unique and dynamic instrument
developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the
conditions for lasting peace.” United Nations Peacekeeping,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
175. The UN describes peace-building as “[b]uilding lasting peace in war-torn
societies.” Peacebuilding,
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacebuilding (last visited
Sept. 23, 2010).
176. The UN does not use the term nation-building: “Nation-building means
different things to different people and is not a term used by the UN. It normally
refers to a longer historical process and includes the building up of a national
identity.” Peacebuilding Q&A,
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/library_2006peacebuildingt.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2010).
177. Although the UN does not directly define state-building, it pledges to
complete actions that “[l]ead states or territories through a transition to stable
government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic
development.” Mission Statement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/info/mission.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2010);
See also Maria Blackburn,
Head of State, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE,
http://www.jhu.edu/jhumag/0904web/fukuyama.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010)
(defining state-building as “constructing formal institutions that make collective life
in a society possible.”).
178. It is interesting to note that even the spelling of the words is not
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Moreover, in each of these situations the UN may be
involved in a vast array of actions. These actions can range from
organizing elections to the international administration of
territories, each of which encompass different needs and each of
which could be met with varying degrees of suspicion by
Member States, depending on how invasive they are judged to
be given the prevalence of the concept of sovereignty in state’s
179
actions and rhetoric. For instance, a less “intrusive” mandate
(such as organizing an election) would likely be welcomed by the
occupying country, but would likely require fewer obligations
180
than other actions, such as the administration of one State. If
the Peacebuilding Commission could aid in clarifying that there
are different types of post-conflict efforts and differing
obligations for each, this could be of enormous practical
significance in developing a framework of action.
3. The Content of Jus Post Bellum
The third, and probably the most difficult, aspect that needs
to be addressed is the content of jus post bellum; for although
the idea of a jus post bellum has been around since the end of
the 18th century, its exact contours have never been
181
determined. There are several suggestions in the scholarship
of what jus post bellum should encompass. Sonia K. Han
includes: 1) free and fair elections; 2) democratization; 3) ceasefire, demobilization, demilitarization and other military aspects;
4) police force; 5) judicial, penal and other constitutional
consensual. For instance, the word peace-building is found both with a hyphen and
as one word.
179. Clancy Chassay, Suspicion of UN Troops Grows in South Lebanon, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/23/syria.unitednations (exemplifying
member-state suspicion of invasive UN peacekeeping action favoring Israel over
Lebanon).
180. See Iraq: Elections Mark Start of New Phase Where National Dialogue
NEWS
CENTRE
(Dec.
9,
2005),
Vital,
Annan
Says,
UN
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=iraq&Cr1=&NewsID=16880 (“‘The fact
that the political process has remained on target against an ambitious timetable is a
considerable achievement in itself given the difficult conditions in which it has taken
place,’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan says in his report to the Security Council,
voicing satisfaction that the UN was able to support the Iraqi people at every step of
the process.”); See also G.A. Res. 54/173, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/173 (Feb. 15,
2000) (“Acknowledging that the United Nations electoral assistance has facilitated
the holding of successful elections in several Member States.”).
181. See DiMeglio, supra note 137, at 133 (declaring that there was virtually no
th
discourse on jus post bellum after Kant’s works in the 18 century until 1994).
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reforms; 6) respect for human rights; 7) repatriation of refugees
and other displaced persons; 8) mine clearance; 9) emergency
relief and humanitarian assistance; and 10) other aspects of
182
Michael Schuck has a
rehabilitation and reconstruction.
shorter but broader list encompassing repentance, honorable
183
surrender, and restoration. Michael Walzer, instead of setting
defined specific criteria, sets a more abstract principle to
underscore a jus post bellum: “‘better state of peace’. . ..
‘[B]etter, within the confines of the argument for justice, means
more secure than the status quo ante bellum, less vulnerable to
territorial expansion, safer for ordinary men and women and for
184
their domestic self-determinations.’”
Based on these examples, one could say that not only there
is not a consensual understanding of the content of a modern jus
post bellum, but also that there are significant differences in the
approaches adopted to tackle the issue. These may be explained
by the fact that the choices in relation to what is necessary for
justice are driven primarily by subjective concerns. That is, the
same issue can be seen as indispensable by some and not
relevant by others. The contrasts involved in selecting the
content of a jus post bellum may be said to reflect deeper
contradictions, that (1) often what is needed for immediate relief
185
of problems might put long-term strategies in jeopardy; (2)
that peace and justice sometimes may push in different
186
(3) that responding to security threats and
directions;
protecting human rights sometimes requires contradictory
187
actions; and (4) that the laws can be used either to maintain
182.
183.
184.

See Han, supra note 24, at 871–75.
See DiMeglio, supra note 137, at 134–37.
Id. at 138 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, at 121–122

(1977)).
185. See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 43 (“Satisfying these twin imperatives [,
immediate needs and long term goals, ] is complicated by the fact that each
generates its own set of demands and that these demands may not be entirely
compatible with one another.”); See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 146 (“[T]he
exercise of power by a transitional administration in a manner that contradicts
principles intended to bind future local regimes—such as democratic principles, the
rule of law, separation of powers, and respect for human rights—may actually harm
the prospects of good governance in the longer term.”).
186. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 14–19 (discussing the difficulties of seeking
both peace and justice).
187. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 146 (“Of particular interest in this
section are two further aspects of accountability that are relevant to these
operations. The first concerns the balance that a transitional administration strikes
between responding to legitimate security threats and its obligation to protect and
promote human rights.”).
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188

the status quo or to propel change.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, if one opts for the
broader approach to defining a modern jus post bellum instead
of a specific set of substantive rules, one may be able to find
common ground. Combining the contents expressed above and
trying to summarize them, a modern jus post bellum should
encompass a broad notion of law and order, and help establish
two ideas that are essential for social order: the rule of law and
physical and economic security. To fully understand and
properly apply the rule of law, the main concerns are the
definition of the applicable rule, the respect for minimum
standards of human rights and the creation of lasting
institutions (including the judiciary and elections). To properly
ensure security to citizens of an occupied country, the main
concerns are policing, the penal system, public order and
189
economic stability and development.
Another way to justify a broader approach is to look at the
potential development of a modern jus post bellum through the
lens of global administrative law, which would support the idea
of creating frameworks instead of detailed substantive rules.
Global administrative law is concerned with “all the rules and
procedures that help ensure the accountability of global
administration, and it focuses in particular on administrative
structures, on transparency, on participatory elements in the
administrative
procedure,
on
principles
of
reasoned
190
decisionmaking, and on mechanisms of review.”
Because of this, “[t]he focus of the field of global
administrative law is not, therefore, the specific content of
substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or
possible principles, procedural rules, review mechanisms, and
other mechanisms relating to transparency, participation,

188. See Teitel, supra note 133, at 1617 (“A core tension emerges in the use of
law to advance transformation, as opposed to its role in adherence to conventional
legality.”).
189. For more details on the challenges involved in each of these aspects, see
CAPLAN supra note 20, at 45-67 (discussing the use of policing and penal institutions
to maintain public order and internal security); Cf. CHESTERMAN supra note 2, at
154 (“One of the most important and difficult challenges confronting a post-conflict
society is the re-establishment of faith in the institutions of the state. Respect for
the rule of law in particular, implying subjugation to consistent and transparent
principles under state institutions exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, may face special obstacles.”).
190. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28–28 (2005)..
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reasoned decisionmaking, and assurance of legality in global
191
governance.
Following this approach, the Peacebuilding Commission
could best aid the development of a normative framework for jus
post bellum by establishing such a framework in a broad,
principled way, instead of assessing them by their adequacy to
specific substantive norms. Further justification for this
approach springs from the recognition of the practical
differences in post-conflict efforts and in the axiological
foundation for the choices being made concerning them. In
addition, a broad approach is also justified given the nature and
structure of the Peacebuilding Commission, which is, after all,
merely an advisory organ, with a broad membership, and whose
actions are based on consensus. Needless to say, defining
specific substantive norms in this environment would be a
Herculean task.
Moreover, having this broad framework would mean that
the UN itself would be acting under principles of rule of law,
and would be able to “lead by example.” This could minimize the
criticisms that often arise in connection with post-conflict efforts
192
regarding principles of liberalism and democracy. A broad
framework, therefore, would also increase the legitimacy of UN
actions by establishing a principled way in which to conduct
these actions, which would be based on a comprehensive
193
foundation, given the membership of the organization.
The lack of specific substantive norms could, however, be
seen as problematic, because the status quo—the nonexistence
of clear and specific obligations—would remain. This might, of
course, allow for violations based on varying interpretations of
the broader norms. The existence of specific substantive norms
themselves, however, could also be problematic, because past
191.
192.

Id, 28–29
See Sujit Choudhry, Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building:
Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 933,
933 (2005) (“Practiced in this form, nation-building poses a serious dilemma for
liberal democrats, because of the deep and irreconcilable tension between the
outside imposition of a constitutional order and the right of all peoples to selfdetermination.”).
193. Furthermore, the idea of a broad framework is also more in keeping with
the idea of just war theories insofar as they provide “‘relevant principles that are
intelligible, generalizable, and capable of consistent application,’” L. Christian
Marlin, A Lesson Unlearned: The Unjust Revolution in Rwanda, 1959-1961, 12
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1271, 1276 (1988) (quoting Ralph B. Potter, War and Moral
Discourse 62 (1969)), and could add to legitimacy by focusing on principles of justice
for post-conflict efforts.
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practices have shown that applying the same model of postconflict efforts to different situations is not a successful
194
strategy.
Notwithstanding the problems in defining the content of a
modern jus post bellum, there is reason to believe that the
Peacebuilding Commission can aid in the development of a
normative framework for post-conflict efforts through the
clarification of the concepts related to jus post bellum. It can
also, at a minimum, contribute to a broad framework that would
serve as a principled way to assess post-conflict efforts.
Moreover, the Peacebuilding Commission can assist the creation
of a modern normative framework for post-conflict efforts by
enhancing accountability mechanisms.
IV. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN BE USED AS
A TOOL TO ENHANCE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POSTCONFLICT ACTORS
195

Accountability is a way of constraining power. It “implies
that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their
responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose
sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not
196
In this sense it “presupposes a relationship
been met.”
between power-wielders and those holding them accountable
where there is a general recognition of the legitimacy of (1) the
operative standards for accountability and (2) the authority of
the parties to the relationship (one to exercise particular powers
197
and the other to hold them to account).” Combining these
features with current international circumstances and, adding
to it the tendency of looking into accountability solely through
the lens of legal mechanism, it is difficult to suggest that a
strong accountability mechanism exists in international law.

194. Cf. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 256 (“Just as generals are sometimes
accused of planning to refight their last war, so the United Nations experiments in
transitional administration have reflected only gradual learning. Senior UN officials
now acknowledge that, to varying degrees, Kosovo got the operation that should
have been planned for Bosnia four years earlier, and East Timor got that which
should have been sent to Kosovo.”).
195. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power
in World Politics, 99 (1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005).
196. Id. at 29.
197. Id. at 29.
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A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN USE SEVERAL NONLEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY TO CHECK THE ACTIONS
OF POST-CONFLICT ACTORS
This difficulty is exacerbated by the problems in the
institutional and normative framework of accountability
enforcement, which, as discussed at length above, is the case in
post-conflict efforts. If there are no clear rules, legal
accountability is almost impossible. When there are rules, but
the remedies available are too lax, legal accountability seems to
be difficult. Legal accountability, however, is not the only
possible form of accountability; and one can argue that
depending on the context in which accountability is to be
enforced, the forms and mechanisms of accountability may
198
vary.
Regarding the forms of accountability, Grant and Keohane
suggests that there are two main types: the participation model
199
and the delegation model. In the former, the evaluation of
actions is undertaken by those directly affected by them, and in
the latter, the evaluation is done by the ones delegating the
200
power to act. Generally, these two models do not coincide, but
in the case of post-conflict efforts, both forms of accountability
are relevant and needed, insofar as both the people in the
territory in which the effort is being undertaken and the UN (or
the international community at large) have interests in being
able to hold actors involved in the efforts accountable.
Within these two models, Grant and Keohane identify seven
possible types of accountability: hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal,
legal, market, peer and public or reputational. “Hierarchical
accountability is a characteristic of bureaucracies and of
201
virtually any large organization.” Supervisory accountability
relates to the possibility of an organization to oversee its own
agents, that is, it concerns relations between organizations
“where one organization acts as principal with respect to
202
specified agents.” Fiscal accountability refers to the ability of
198. For instance, on the issue of private military companies Laura A. Dickinson
sets 4 types of accountability (i.e. legal, democratic, contractual and institutional).
See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 Wm. & Mary 135, 135
(2005).
199. Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 31.
200. Id. at 31.
201. Id. at 36.
202. Id. at 36.
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funding agencies to require that the recipient of funds report
203
back to them. “Legal accountability refers to the requirement
that agents abide by forma rules and be prepared to justify their
204
actions in those terms, in courts or quasi-judicial arenas.”
“Market accountability” relates to market agents (such as
205
“Peer
investors and consumers) overseeing actions.
accountability arises as the result of mutual evaluation of
206
and
organizations
by
their
counterparts,”
“[p]ublic/reputational accountability is pervasive because
207
reputation is involved in all the other forms of accountability.”
Under this rubric, even if the Peacebuilding Commission is not
able to develop a modern jus post bellum which ensures the
existence of legal rules that, in turn, ensures legal
accountability, it certainly can play a major role in other forms
of extra-legal accountability.
In relation to hierarchical and supervisory accountability,
the role of a body such as the Peacebuilding Commission is
intuitive, given its placement within the UN, and its mandate to
coordinate the organization’s post conflict efforts. This is
especially true when the Peacebuilding Commission undertakes
country-specific missions. The actors on the field in such
situations would be subject to the Peacebuilding Commission
supervision, and therefore, would be held accountable for their
actions.
Regarding fiscal accountability and peer accountability, the
Peacebuilding Commission, due to its composition, also has an
important role to play. In relation to fiscal accountability,
accountability will certainly exist because the Peacebuilding
Commission unites each of the major donors and financial
208
In relation to
institutions involved in post-conflict efforts.
peer accountability, because the idea is to have an organ to
coordinate strategies, and because all actors involved in postconflict efforts will be present at the same forum and will,
therefore, act as a check upon each other, the Peacebuilding
Commission will enhance accountability among them.
Public or reputational accountability seems, however, the
most promising area in which the Peacebuilding Commission
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 36.
Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37.
G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, at 3.
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can enhance accountability in post-conflict efforts. Firstly,
because the Peacebuilding Commission is an institutionalized
forum for discussion, adding the element of transparency into
the debate of post-conflict efforts will enhance accountability, in
the sense that it will present the positions of the involved actors
209
openly, so that they can be objectively assessed and evaluated.
Secondly, if the Peacebuilding Commission is able to establish
the broad normative framework mentioned above, and from that
is able to establish a principled way of assessing the standards
of post-conflict efforts, this method would enhance
accountability
because
standards
of
legitimacy
are
210
indispensable to holding actors accountable. Thirdly, as Grant
and Keohane suggest, one important problem of international
accountability appears when the actors involved are powerful
211
states with constitutional democracies. Because these states
are nationally accountable, it is difficult to hold these states
legally accountable internationally. “The only forms of external
accountability to which they are consistently subject, across a
range of issue areas, are peer accountability and reputational
212
Furthermore,
“[t]hese
attempts
at
accountability.”
accountability, however, depend on efforts, often ad hoc, to
establish a basis of legitimacy on which to hold a state
213
The actions of the Peacebuilding Commission
accountable.”
can thus be an important step towards establishing these forms
of accountability insofar as all the powerful states are in one
way or another involved in post-conflict situations. Moreover,
because it is an established organ and not an ad hoc effort,
perhaps it can be more successful than envisioned by Grant and
Keohane.
B. NON-LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY WILL ENHANCE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
If these were the only types of accountability that the
Peacebuilding Commission was able to impose, it would already
be a positive development in both post-conflict efforts and in
international law. Depending on how far the Peacebuilding
Commission is able to advance the establishment of a modern
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 39.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id
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jus post bellum, however, it could also aid in improving legal
accountability. This would entail a further step in developing
jus post bellum: clarifying concepts and obligations alone is not
sufficient—it is also necessary to establish remedies for
violations. Mechanisms used by the Trusteeship Council,
including period reports and in loco visits, are one possible
214
solution, but this alone will not suffice. Harsher sanctions
must be imposed both upon individuals and upon the State or
organization that undertakes the post-conflict effort. This
requires a new reading of immunity rules and the political
compromise either to make the existing avenues for remedies
(such as the International Criminal Court) more effective or to
create new paths to accountability. Since the scholarship on the
issue is in its early stages, it is not yet possible to state clearly
what types of remedies should be used in such situations.
However, the issue of accountability is paramount in the area of
post-conflict efforts, and, therefore, in the work of the
Peacebuilding Commission.
V. CONCLUSION
From the forgoing, one can see that the Peacebuilding
Commission is a long-needed institutional reform of the UN
insofar as it aims to enhance activities already being performed
215
by the institution in the area of post-conflict efforts . It seems
that the Peacebuilding Commission indicates the existence of a
consensus concerning obligations in post-conflict efforts—that
216
is, the existence of a jus post bellum in broad terms. At the
217
same time, this area of international law is just starting, but
it is potentially capable of broadening these obligations to
include current situations and to establish a normative
framework that would enhance the rights of local populations
214. See CHESTERMAN supra note 2, at 39–40 (“The Council’s basic
responsibilities were to consider reports from the administering power, to accept
petitions from inhabitants, and to provide for periodic visits.”); See also Mohamed
supra note 84, at 829–30 (“Transferring management to the Trusteeship Council
thus provides an avenue for holding UN personnel accountable for their actions and
holding the UN to the same standards that it seeks to impose on the territories in
which it operates.”).
215. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra.
216. See generally G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180, supra.
217. See generally Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition:
Defining Jus Post Bellum and Inger Osterdahl, What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of
New Wine Bottles and Old, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
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218

and ensure accountability.
Even though it is not what was initially proposed and
219
desired, the Peacebuilding Commission seems to be able to
contribute to post-conflict efforts. And, like most actors in the
international legal scenario, the most successful strategy would
be to find the niches in which it can be most effective and
contribute the most to international law.
Potentially, and in light of the nature and structure of the
Peacebuilding Commission and of the need of post-conflict
efforts, the most profitable niche it could fill would include
220
developing a broad framework for post-conflict efforts, which
would help to clarify concepts of modern jus post bellum and
establish a principled way of assessing the law in this area. This
221
would, n addition, enhance accountability through increased
222
transparency, and create a standardized way of evaluating
223
post-conflict actions being taken.
If the Peacebuilding Commission is able to fill these gaps, it
would not only fulfill its mandate—thereby helping the UN
meet its goals—it would also contribute significantly to
international governance and international law.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Section III.
See, for instance, section I, B.
See, for instance, section III, B, 3
See, for instance, section IV.
Grant & Keohane, supra
See generally G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180, supra Para 13.

